

## **Illegal Oil Bunkering and the Niger Delta Crisis: The Post Amnesty Bayelsa State**

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### **Abstract**

The researcher evaluated the illegal oil bunkering and the Niger Delta Crisis and the post amnesty Bayelsa State of Nigeria. The expansion of illegal oil bunkering, amnesty offer and programs including the interventionist strategies are related to the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region. This study's research design follows a logical sequence that connects empirical data to the study's research questions and hypotheses, and ultimately to its conclusions. Stratified sampling technique was used in grouping respondents into ex-militants, staff of commissions and agencies, and the public. The questionnaires were analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 21. Mean, cross tabulation and ANOVA were the means of analysis. Cronback Alpha reliability estimate was used to test the reliability of the instrument and a value of .887 was obtained, which demonstrated robust reliability. The study found that the expansion of illegal oil bunkering, amnesty offer and programs including the interventionist strategies are related to the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region. This study recommends that the illegal oil bunkering, which is significantly related to the crisis and underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region should be addressed through ensuring that the petro dollar money laundering should be reduced to the barest minimum. The amnesty offer and programs including the post amnesty program in the Niger Delta region must be revisited to ensure that major issues in the Niger crisis are addressed, and the interventionist strategies by various commissions, agencies and committees must be strengthened to significantly impact on the development of the Niger Delta region.

**Keywords:** Illegal, Oil bunkering, Amnesty Programs, Strategies, Bayelsa State, Niger Delta, Crisis, Commission, Agencies, Committees, Interventionist.

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### **INTRODUCTION**

The dynamics in the Niger Delta crisis has taken another dimension. For years, the Niger Delta militants have held the nation to ransom, destroying vital oil installations and kidnapping expatriate oil workers, most of whom had to flee the region. Their activities took a huge toll on the nation's oil revenue. The country lost at least a quarter of its oil production due to frequent attacks on oil facilities resulting in shut-downs and unwholesome activities of oil bunkering cartels. The report of the Ledum Mitee led Technical Committee on the Niger Delta estimated that the country lost about 8.84 trillion naira or 61.6 billion dollars to oil theft and sabotage in the volatile region between 2006 and 2008 (Newswatch, 2009).

Besides the losses in oil revenue, the human casualty is also alarming. Not less than 5000 people lost their lives during the said period under investigation. Furthermore, businesses,

especially off-shore business activities collapsed rendering thousands of people jobless due to the fear of frequent attacks and disruption by militants.

The deployment of the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) to restore order and create a conducive environment to do business could not meaningfully reduce or hinder the activities of the militants. Militancy and its attendant effects on the Nigerian state's ability to meet its quota in the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) further battered the country's image in the international community.

But on the 25<sup>th</sup> of June, 2009 late President Umaru Yar'Adua tried a new approach. He thus granted amnesty to the militants with effect from the 6<sup>th</sup> of August and gave them 60 days within which to drop their weapons and renounce militancy. The Yar'Adua's move was seen as his way of stopping a very complex problem that had defied previous attempts, including a previous amnesty deal by Obasanjo's administration with Asari to be specific and the Niger Delta militants in general.

In the light of the high level expectation and anticipation, the crux of the matter has to do with the workability and sustainability of the post amnesty rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-militants. The sincerity or otherwise of the program further illustrates or explains the "paradox of plenty", "the resources curse" etc. and the debilitating effects of oil politics in Nigeria. Just as Prof. Okowa put it, "marginalization of the Niger Delta in the politics of Nigeria..." According to him, the Niger Delta has contributed more to the economic development of Nigeria than any other geo-political region in the country.

However the people of Niger Delta, particularly the masses, have paid and will continue to pay a terrible price in terms of environmental degradation, for the oil and gas resources mined from their region (The Goose, 2007). It can even be likened to the crisis caused by the struggle for the control of 'Diamonds' in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Anna, 2003).

### **Statement of the Problems**

It is also evident that in post amnesty Niger Delta that the focus of the youths have generally moved from kidnapping and vandalization of pipelines as well as disruption of the working of oil facilities and installations to illegal bunkering and refining of crude oil. Essentially, because of the rudimentary level of technical know-how, the output is basically diesel and kerosene. These makeshift refineries also acting as destructive agents alongside the legal refineries caused more damage to the environment. In addition to these illegal refineries, gas flaring and spillage of crude oil has further destroyed and contaminated farmlands and waterways which form the basis of the existence of the local people. Gas flaring as well as the destruction of our ecosystem with these refineries due to poor working and maintenance and the apparent neglect of safety regulations and procedures, added to the spillages and contamination of the farmlands and water which form the basis of the existence of the local people (Okechukwu, 2000).

The expansion of illegal oil bunkering, amnesty offer and programs including the interventionist strategies relate to the development of the Niger Delta region. To this end, there is the urgent need to evaluate their effect on Niger Delta development.

### **Objective of the Study**

Specifically, the study is intended to:

- Examine the activity of the illegal oil bunkering and the development of the Niger Delta region;
- Examine the extent to which the amnesty offer and programs are related to the development of the Niger Delta region;
- Examine the interventionist strategies (the various commissions & committees) and the development of Niger Delta region; and
- Recommend better internal and external solutions to the problems of insecurity and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region.

## **Research Questions**

Three research questions that arose from the statement of problems to guide the research process:

- To what extent is illegal oil bunkering related to the development of the Niger Delta region?
- To what extent are the amnesty offer and programs related to the development of the Niger Delta region?
- To what extent is the interventionist strategies by various commissions and committees related to the development of the Niger Delta region?

## **Hypotheses**

- Illegal oil bunkering is significantly not related to the development of the Niger Delta region.
- Amnesty offer and programs are not significantly related to the development of the Niger Delta region.
- The interventionist strategies by various commissions and committees are significantly not related to the development of the Niger Delta region.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Illegal Oil Bunkering**

Nigeria is the world's seventh largest exporter of crude oil, shipping nearly 2.5 million barrels a day. As one of the largest oil exporters in the world, Nigeria's oil has been and continues to be a great source of revenue for oil companies and for the Nigerian government (Ololube, Onyekwere, Kpolovie & Agabi, 2012; Nwogwugwu, Alao, & Egwuonwu, 2012). The Nigerian economy is dependent on the exploitation of oil and the nation's future is very much tied to crude oil. However, with an estimated population of almost 160 million people and a political system struggling to establish a democracy after decades of military rule, Nigeria has been plagued with widespread corruption closely associated with the bunkering of crude oil. Bunkering is a term used to describe the process of filling a ship with oil (or coal). "Illegal bunkering" as used in respect to oil is a euphemism for oil theft. Large-scale illegal oil bunkering has become an increasingly significant issue over the last six years (Davis, von Kemedi & Drennan, n.d).

Furthermore, illegal oil bunkering otherwise known as oil theft siphons the main source of the Nigerian economy for private gains before taxation or crediting to the national account. Various experts have estimated the volume of oil theft at between 100,000 and 250,000 barrels per day or as much as 91 million barrels yearly or billions of dollars in lost revenue (Onwuemenyi, 2012).

Tampering with or sabotage to pipelines and flow-stations and careless handling during the bunkering process cause the greatest environmental damage to the Niger Delta region, according to environmental activists (Davis et al.; n.d; Okaba, 2005; Nwaomah, 2009a, b). Vast areas of the Niger Delta have become saturated with oil as a result of the many oil spills associated with illegal bunkering and pipeline sabotage. According to Onwuemenyi (2012) the traditional livelihoods, such as fishing and farming, have become increasingly difficult if not impossible to pursue. Alternative jobs, however, have not been created for the largely unskilled and poorly educated residents of the impacted areas. He further stated that many of the arms in circulation in the Niger Delta, including a variety of sophisticated weapons, have been purchased with money derived directly or indirectly from illegal bunkering. Insecurity in some parts of the country results in part, from accessibility of oil-purchased arms with illegal bunkering serving as a major contributor to Nigeria's violent crime, armed robbery, piracy and kidnapping (Okaba, 2005).

The illegal refining activities take place within the creeks and the environs. These activities are alarming. The activities have led to pipeline vandalism, river and land pollution, environmental degradation, oil theft and loss of revenue to the federal government. The poorly-refined products, when sold and distributed, result in economic and health disasters, such as kerosene explosions and vehicle breakdown, among others.

According to The Economy (2012), business involves a vast expanse of network and routes. The oil thieves who siphon crude oil from oil fields and pipelines in the Niger Delta are able to do so because of their vast expanse of network and routes. The stolen crudes are thereafter transported through the creeks and rivers to the Ocean where larger vessels are always on stand-by to buy the crude oil at a give-away price. Worse still, most of the stolen crude oils from Niger Delta are traded with forged papers.

Besides, illegal refining activities featuring prominently in every day discourse in local communities and among security operatives, the rising spate of illegal refineries and oil theft also formed part of the agenda at a recent meeting of the South- South Governors in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State. The governors were reportedly alarmed by the resurgent of illegal refineries in their domain.

Despite federal government's continuous crackdown on oil thieves and operators of illegal refineries in some parts of Niger Delta, the business is still thriving, amidst growing disquiet over the long-term implications of the activities on the economy and the affected environment (Obeche, 2012).

### **Interventionist Strategies (The various commissions & committees)**

The federal government in 2009 introduced a program called amnesty for all the militants in the Niger Delta, with the aim of making them to return their arms and enter into the amnesty program. This was done in order to ensure that the activities of the militants which had defied military action in the region did not lead to the eventual collapse of the economy. The amnesty program for ex-militants was intended to give repentant militants the sum of N65, 000 each as

monthly stipend while they were trained on various skills both at home and abroad, to enable them gain employment and become re-integrated into the society (Nwogwugwu et al., 2012).

Furthermore, as part of the amnesty program, several of the ex-militants were sent overseas to participate in skill acquisition programs that would ensure their re-integration into the society (Awosiyan, 2011). However, in spite of the enormous amount being expended on stipends for the ex-militants, skill acquisition and their re-integration, several controversies have trailed the amnesty program. Prominent among the controversies has been the neglect of the social infrastructure in the region which has been the major cause of the militancy in the first place; differences in the actual number of ex-militants involved in the program as well as violent demonstrations by ex-militants from the region alleging neglect following their non-inclusion in the amnesty program or non-payment of their monthly stipend (Punch Newspapers, 2012; Premium Times, 2012; Tamuno, 2012).

The implementation of amnesty program for the ex-militants has not translated to increase in the inflow of Direct Foreign Investment (DFI). The recent upsurge of the level of insecurity in the region, following agitations by some ex-militants and counter claims by government agencies (especially the Amnesty program office) shows that more needs to be done, to tackle the genuine demands of the people beyond settlement of the militants.

### **The Niger Delta Commission, Agencies and Committees**

The Willink Report of 1958 succinctly declared that the NDR are a group of independent and autonomous kingdoms and peoples, with separate languages, culture and religion, equal in status and in no way subordinate to one another but united as a corporate body to form the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The report also recommended that the Niger Delta be given special attention. This eventually led to the establishment of various interventionist agencies (Idumange, 2011).

According to Idumange (2011), subsequent to the Willink Commission Report of 1958, the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) was created in 1960. The Board did not make any impact until after the 30 months of fratricidal civil war. This was followed by the establishment of the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA). Like its predecessor agency, the NDBDA was under-funded in such a manner as not make any meaningful impact. Besides, the Federal Government created ten (10) other Basin Authorities and funded the others to the detriment the original one. The NDBDA was also emasculated by the Nigerian experience.

The renewed agitations during the Second Republic led to the establishment in 1980, of the 1.5% Presidential Task Force. The Task Force could not create the desired impact because of poor funding. The Babangida regime in 1992 created the Oil Mineral Producing Development Areas Commission (OMPADEC) which was killed by the conspiracy of official highhandedness, under funding and lack of accountability. Currently the subsisting Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) is under-funded and there are genuine complaints about lack of internal accountability within the Commission. Since the inception of the NDDC, very little has been achieved.

Nigeria is a crude oil mono-culture and a renter state par excellence because it relies exclusively on foreign exchange on crude oil. A renter State and renter economy led to a renter mentality, which dooms a country's economy and long-term prospects. The implication is that there is exceptionally high value for oil and a corresponding usually high level of external interventions in shaping the affairs of the country. Essentially, Nigeria has less subject to the

internal countervailing pressures. This explains why the conflict in the NDR snowballed into a mini-form of insurgency. The local population suffers from economic exclusion – they do not participate in the ownership, production and enjoyment of their own resources because of an unfair legal regime.

### **Functions and Powers of the NDCC**

According to the Niger Delta Development Commission (2010) and Aghalino (2012), the functions and powers of the Niger-Delta Development Commission according to Section 7(1) are:

- Formulate policies and guide lines for the development of the Niger Delta Area;
- Conceive, plan and implement, in accordance with set rules and regulations, projects and programs for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta area in the field of transport, including roads, jetties and waterways, health, employment, industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water-supply, electricity and telecommunications;
- Tackle ecological and environmental problems that arise from the exploration of oil mineral in Niger Delta area and advise the Federal Government and the member states on his prevention and control of oil spillages, gas flaring and developmental pollution;
- Assess and report on any project being funded or carried out in the Niger-Delta area by oil and gas producing companies and any other company including non-governmental organizations and ensure that funds released for such projects are properly utilized;
- Liaise with various oil mineral and gas prospecting and producing companies on all matters of pollution, prevention and control; and
- Execute such other works and perform such other functions which, in the opinion of the Commission, are required for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta area and its people.

The Commission, apart from the above functions, shall cause the Niger Delta area to be surveyed in order to ascertain measures which are necessary to promote its physical and socio-economic development, prepare master plans and schemes, estimates and costs designed for the implementation of such schemes, implement all measures approved for the development of the Niger Delta area by the Federal Government and constituent States of the commission; identify factors-inhibiting the development of the Niger Delta area and assist member states in the formulation and implementation of policies to ensure sound and efficient management of the Resources of the Niger Delta area.

Since the inception of the Niger Delta Development Commission, it has embarked on systematic efforts to put in place enduring institutions and operational mechanisms which will consolidate its take-off, in order to prevent the mistakes of the past. A pointer to the failure of the Niger Delta Development Commission could be seen in the caustic remark about the Niger Delta in 2006 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) when it noted that the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and service, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth, squalor, and endemic conflict (UNDP, 2006; Aghalino, 2012).

## **Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs**

The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs was created in September 2008 by his Excellency, the former Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua to formulate and coordinate policies for the development and security of the Niger Delta region.

According to the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (2013), the ministry is expected to formulate and execute plans, programmes and other initiatives as well as coordinate the activities of Agencies, Communities, donors and other stakeholders involved in the development of the Niger Delta region.

The establishment of the Ministry is a demonstration of Yar'Adua's determination to transform the Niger Delta region and ensure a lasting peace in the region. His sincerity in changing the outlook of the Niger Delta is evidenced in his inclusion of the Niger Delta in his Seven-Point Agenda. Yar'Adua believes that if there is sustained peace in the Niger Delta, it would be possible for the Ministry of Niger Delta and its development partners to fix the problems in the region. Their specific functions include:

- Oversee the implementation of Government policies on the development and security of the Niger Delta region;
- Coordinate the formulation of the development plan for the region;
- Formulate policies and programs for youth mobilization in the Niger Delta region;
- Advise Government on security issues concerning the region;
- Liaise with relevant Government, non-government and private sector organizations;
- Formulate and coordinate policies for environmental management;
- Liaise with host communities for the enhancement of the welfare of the people and the development of the region;
- Facilitate sector involvement in the region;
- Plan and supervise programs on public education/enlightenment;
- Liaise with oil companies operating in the region to ensure environmental protection and pollution control;
- Organize human capacity development as well as skills acquisition programs for the youths;
- Take adequate measures to ensure peace, stability, and security with a view to enhancing the economic potentials of the area; and
- Submit reports periodically to Mr. President on all matters concerning the region.

Nevertheless, according to Aghalino (2012), there is balance of evidence to suggest that though Yar'Adua administration was brief, it had a revolutionary impact in the development and resolution of the Niger Delta conflict and by extension, the sustainable development of the oil-bearing enclave. The point was made that the regime met worst case scenario when it was inaugurated in 2007. A careful perusal of previous efforts to checkmate the crisis in the region failed due in part to lack of political will and vested interest. The commitment and sincerity of Yar'Adua, which culminated in the granting of amnesty to the militant was a master stroke as this naturally allowed other developmental initiatives of the administration to fall on fertile soil. The death of the president after a protracted illness almost created vacuum in the pursuit of the peace process in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

However, the functions of NDDC and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) as provided by the Acts that established them are nebulous hence until the Management and Board of NDDC and The MNDA exercises substantial discretion, the Commission may be tempted to do everything and achieve nothing (Idumange, 2011).

## **METHODS**

The design for this study follows a logical sequence that connects empirical data to the study's research questions and hypotheses, and ultimately to its conclusions (Yin, 2002). As a result, this study included specific research design features from broad theoretical perspectives to help assess the issues of Niger Delta crisis and illegal oil bunkering and development in post amnesty Bayelsa State. This survey research aims to describe specific characteristics of the target population, which involves the gathering of limited data from the study's accessible population.

In method literature there is not one single right way or most appropriate way to analyze data. Analysis, however, implies and indeed requires a principal choice. For this study, a quantitative approach was employed as an inquiry process that would allow readers to understand and interpret observable facts in this study's context. This is done by building a complex, holistic picture, formed with data and/or words and reporting the detailed views of the respondents (Creswell, 2003, 2007; Greene, 2007; Ololube, 2013). The design adopted in this study is based on ranking and measuring variables with numbers and analyzing them with statistical measures in order to determine their relative strength (Creswell & Plano, 2007). The emphasis is on the measurement and analysis of fundamental relationships between variables (Ololube, 2013).

The population of the study covers Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, and Rivers States because of their central position in the Niger Delta. However, Bayelsa State had more militant groups than other oil producing states. Bayelsa is located on the southern coast of Nigeria, and is bordered by Delta and Rivers states and the Atlantic Ocean, covering an estimated 21,100 square kilometers and an estimated population of 1,703,385 million people (National population census report, 2006). The state is comprised of eight local government areas, viz; Ekeremor, Sagbama, Ogbia, Southern Ijaw, Nembe, Brass, Kolokuma/Opokuma and Yenagoa.

Stratified sampling technique was utilized for the grouping of respondents into (ex-militants, staff of commissions and agencies, and the public) for the study. The adoption of the technique was informed by the idea that everyone in the sample frame is a living witness to the problem under consideration.

In order to gather the relevant data needed for the study, a questionnaire designed along 6-point Likert type scale 1=Totally disagree (TD), 2= Disagree (D), 3= Partly Disagree (PD), 4=Partly agree (PA), 5=Agree (A), and 6=Totally agree (TA), was administered to respondents. The questionnaire was divided into two sections: section 'A' dealt with issues of respondent's demographic information. Section 'B' was designed to elicit information on the role of oil bunkering interventionist strategies and the Niger Delta commissions, agencies and committees and their responsibilities in the Niger Delta crisis and post amnesty Bayelsa State of Nigeria. Section 'B' of the questionnaire comprised 19 items (illegal oil bunkering, 7 items; interventionist strategies, 6 items; the role Niger Delta Commission, Agencies and Committees, 6 items).

The data gathered for this study was collected from respondents living in Bayelsa State and the various commissions and agencies responsible for implementation and the rehabilitation of ex-militants. A total of nine hundred (900) questionnaires were distributed to respondents in the selected areas (Camps, Commissions and the Public), of which eight hundred and fifty-four (854) were returned. From the returned questionnaires, eight hundred and thirty seven (837) questionnaires were selected for analysis. Seventeen questionnaires were not used because of completion errors or omissions.

The questionnaires were analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 21. Mean, cross tabulation and ANOVA were the means of analysis. Mean was used to determine the strength of some variables to the weakness of others. Cross tabulation was used because it is one of the simplest and most common ways of demonstrating the presence or absence of a relationship (Bryman & Cramer, 2011). The ANOVA analysis, set at  $p. < 0.05$  significance level, was used to determine the relationship between the respondents' background information and the Niger Delta crisis, the challenge and its impact on development in post amnesty Bayelsa state of Nigeria.

Respondents for this study included 589 (70.4%) male and 248 (29.6%) female. 514 (61.4%) were between 20-30 years, 276 (33.0%) were 31-40 years, and 31 (3.7%) were 41-50 years, while 16 (1.9%) were above 50 years. Of these, 284 (33.9%) were single, 553 (66.1%) were married. See Table 1 for the full demographic information of the respondents.

Table 1: Frequency Table for Respondent' Personal Data

s/n	Respondents background information		Frequency	%
1	Gender	Male	589	70.4
		Female	248	29.6
2	Age	20-30 years	514	61.4
		31-40 years	276	33.0
		41-50 years	31	3.7
		Above 50 years	16	1.9
3	Marital Status	Single	284	33.9
		Married	553	66.1
4	Level of Education	School Cert/Diploma	279	33.3
		Undergraduate	372	44.4
		First degree/HND	124	14.8
		Postgraduate degree	62	7.4
5	Status of Respondents	Ex-militants	403	48.1
		Staff of Commissions and Agencies	108	12.9
		The public	326	38.9
6	State of Origin	Abia	27	3.2
		Akwa Ibom	35	4.2
		Bayelsa	413	49.3
		Cross Rivers	67	8.0
		Delta	112	13.4
		Edo	57	6.8
	Rivers	126	15.1	

## Validity and Reliability of the Instrument

The instruments used in this research were valid because the researcher has taken time to comply with the formalities and procedures adopted in framing a research questionnaire. The face and the content validity of the research instruments (questionnaire) were determined with the assistance of experts in the design of questionnaires and faculty colleagues experienced in the construction of research tools. The inputs of these evaluators helped to restructure a number of questionnaire items.

The reliability of the questionnaire was established using the Cronback Alpha reliability estimate, which gave a cumulative reliability value of .887, which demonstrates strong reliability.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Research Question 1 and Hypothesis 1

To what extent is illegal oil bunkering related to the development of the Niger Delta region?

Illegal oil bunkering is significantly not related to the development of the Niger Delta region.

Data from the cross tabulation and ANOVA analysis revealed that the causes of illegal oil bunkering are significantly related to the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region. 84.3% of the respondents agree that large-scale illegal oil bunkering has become an increasingly significant issue over the last six years, which has affected the nation's economic development ( $F = 35.397, P < .000$ ). Likewise, 69.9% agree that Nigeria has been plagued with widespread corruption closely associated with the illegal bunkering crude oil ( $F = 12.777, P < .001$ ). While, 72.5% agree that illegal oil bunkering otherwise known as oil theft siphons the main source of the Nigerian economy for private gains before taxation or crediting to the national account ( $F = 22.074, P < .000$ ). Whereas, 77.7% agree that sabotage to pipelines and flow-stations and careless handling during the bunkering process cause the greatest environmental damage to the Niger Delta region ( $F = 19.680, P < .000$ ). In addition, 98.3% agree that vast areas of the Niger Delta have become saturated with oil as a result of the many oil spills associated with illegal bunkering and pipeline sabotage ( $F = 640.837, P < .000$ ). 90.8% agree that the traditional livelihoods of the people of Niger Delta, such as fishing and farming, have become increasingly difficult if not impossible to pursue because of the presence of oil exploration in the region ( $F = 239.021, P < .000$ ). Finally, 79.9% agree that the accessibility of oil-purchased arms with illegal bunkering serves as a major contributor to Nigeria's violent crimes, armed robbery, piracy and kidnapping ( $F = 11.638, P < .003$ ). The overall results depicts that illegal oil bunkering is significantly related to the crisis and underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region (see table 2a and b). Therefore, hypothesis 1 was rejected.

Table 2a: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showing whether illegal oil bunkering is significantly not related to the development of the Niger Delta region

<i>s/n</i>	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Disagree (D)</i>	<i>Agree (A)</i>
1	Large-scale illegal oil bunkering	15.7%	84.3%
2	Plagued with widespread corruption	30.1%	69.9%
3	Oil theft siphons the main source	27.5%	72.5%
4	Sabotage to pipelines and flow-stations	22.3%	77.7%
5	Oil spills are associated with illegal bunkering	1.7%	98.3%
6	Livelihoods: increasingly difficult	9.2%	90.8%
7	Oil-purchased arms and violent crime	20.1%	79.9%

Table 2b: Cross tabulation Analysis showing whether illegal oil bunkering is significantly not related to the development of the Niger Delta region

<i>s/n</i>	<i>Variables</i>		<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F Ratio</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
1	Large-scale illegal oil bunkering	Between Groups	68.171	1	68.171	35.397	.000
		Within Groups	1608.125	835	1.926		
		Total	1676.296	836			
2	Plagued with widespread corruption	Between Groups	7.735	1	17.735	12.777	.001
		Within Groups	1709.895	835	2.048		
		Total	1717.630	836			
3	Oil theft siphons the main source	Between Groups	.068	1	32.068	22.074	.000
		Within Groups	764.599	835	.916		
		Total	764.667	836			
4	Sabotage to pipelines and flow-stations	Between Groups	37.013	1	37.013	19.680	.000
		Within Groups	1570.395	835	1.881		
		Total	1607.407	836			
5	Oil spills are associated with illegal bunkering	Between Groups	368.926	1	368.926	640.837	.000
		Within Groups	480.704	835	.576		
		Total	849.630	836			
6	The traditional livelihoods, have become increasingly difficult	Between Groups	252.963	1	252.963	239.021	.000
		Within Groups	883.704	835	1.058		
		Total	1136.667	836			
7	Oil-purchased arms and violent crime	Between Groups	1.934	1	31.934	11.638	.003
		Within Groups	985.474	835	1.180		
		Total	987.407	836			

## Research Question 2 and Hypothesis 2

To what extent are the amnesty offer and programs related to the development of the Niger Delta region?

Amnesty offer and programs are not related to the development of the Niger Delta region

Data from the results revealed that the amnesty offer and programs are significantly related to the relative peace and development of the Niger Delta region. From the result, 77.9% agree that the federal government introduction of amnesty program in 2009 has created relative peace and security in the region ( $F = 116.567, P < .000$ ). In addition, 67.2% agree that the training of ex-militants on various skills both at home and abroad, to enable them gain employment and

become re-integrated into the society is a failure ( $F = 12.042, P < .003$ ). Whereas, 76.4% are of the view that in spite of the enormous amount being expended on stipends for the ex-militants, skill acquisition and their re-integration, several controversies have trailed the amnesty program ( $F = 3.642, P < .017$ ). While 81.2% agree that prominent among the controversies in the Niger Delta has been the neglect of the social infrastructure in the region which has been the major cause of the continued militancy in the first place ( $F = 154.734, P < .000$ ). And 85.6% agree that the upsurge of the level of insecurity in the region, following agitations by some ex-militants and counter claims by government agencies shows that more needs to be done, to tackle the genuine demands of the people beyond settlement of the militants ( $F = 242.091, P < .000$ ). Finally, 78.8% agree that the implementation of amnesty program for the ex-militants has not translated to increase in the inflow of Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) ( $F = 5.482, P < .019$ ). The overall result depicts that amnesty offer and programs are not significantly related to the development of the Niger Delta region (see table 3a and b). Thus, hypothesis 2 was accepted.

Table 3a: Cross tabulation analysis showing whether amnesty offer and programs are not significantly related to the development of the Niger Delta region

<i>s/n</i>	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Disagree (D)</i>	<i>Agree (A)</i>
8	Amnesty programme has created peace and security in the region	22.1%	77.9%
9	The training of ex-militants is a failure	32.8%	67.2%
10	Several controversies have trailed the amnesty program	23.6%	76.4%
11	Neglect of the social infrastructure in the region	18.8%	81.2%
12	More needs to be done to tackle the genuine demands	14.4%	85.6%
13	Amnesty program has not translated to increase in the inflow of DFI	21.2%	78.8%

Table 3b: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showing whether amnesty offer and programs are not significantly related to the development of the Niger Delta region

<i>s/n</i>	<i>Variables</i>		<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F Ratio</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
8	Amnesty programme has created peace and security in the region	Between Groups	133.616	1	133.616	116.567	.000
		Within Groups	957.125	835	1.146		
		Total	1090.741	836			
9	The training of ex-militants is a failure	Between Groups	5.922	1	15.922	12.042	.003
		Within Groups	2421.263	835	2.900		
		Total	2427.185	836			
10	Several controversies have trailed the amnesty program	Between Groups	6.353	1	6.353	3.642	.017
		Within Groups	1456.388	835	1.744		
		Total	1462.741	836			
11	Neglect of the social infrastructure in the region	Between Groups	179.141	1	179.141	154.734	.000
		Within Groups	966.711	835	1.158		
		Total	1145.852	836			
12	More needs to be done to tackle the genuine demands	Between Groups	427.866	1	427.866	242.091	.000
		Within Groups	1475.763	835	1.767		
		Total	1903.630	836			
13	Amnesty program has not translated to increase in the inflow of DFI	Between Groups	16.686	1	16.686	5.482	.019
		Within Groups	2541.388	835	3.044		
		Total	2558.074	836			

### Research Question 3 and Hypothesis 3

RQ3: To what extent is the interventionist strategies by various commissions and committees related to the development of the Niger Delta region?

Ho<sub>3</sub>The interventionist strategies by various commissions and committees are significantly not related to the development of the Niger Delta region.

Tests to determine if a significant relationship exists between the interventionist strategies by various commissions and committees in the post amnesty and development of the region revealed that 79.9% agreed that the NDDC and Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs has been unable to formulate policies and guide lines for the development of the Niger-Delta region ( $F = 119.041, P < .000$ ). 71.1% agree that government commissions and agencies have been unable to conceive, plan and implement, in accordance with set rules and regulations, projects and programs for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta ( $F = 17.308, P < .000$ ). In addition, respondents (69.8%) agree that government commissions and agencies has not adequately assessed and reported on projects being funded or carried out in the Niger-Delta area by oil and gas producing companies to ensure that funds released for such projects are properly utilized ( $F = 7.652, P < .006$ ). whereas, 82.2% agree that government commissions and agencies have been unable to tackle ecological and environmental problems that arise from the exploration of oil mineral in Niger Delta area and advice the Federal Government and the member states on the prevention and control of oil spillages, gas flaring and developmental pollution ( $F = 56.388, P < .000$ ). While 76.4% agree that government commissions and agencies has been unable to liaise with host communities for the enhancement of the welfare of the people and the development of the region ( $F = 35.128, P < .000$ ). Finally, 68.7% agree that government commissions and agencies has been unable to liaise with oil companies operating in the region to ensure environmental protection and pollution control as reflected in their MoU ( $F = 11.716, P < .008$ ).

The overall result revealed that the interventionist strategies by various commissions and committees are significantly not related to the development of the Niger Delta region (see table 4a and b). Thus hypothesis 3 was accepted.

Table 4a: Cross tabulation analysis showing whether the interventionist strategies by various commissions and committees are significantly not related to the development of the Niger Delta region

<i>s/n</i>	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Disagree (D)</i>	<i>Agree (A)</i>
14	NDDC and MNDA: formulate policies and guidelines for ND	20.1%	79.9%
15	Govt. commissions and agencies: accordance with set rules and regulations	28.9%	71.1%
16	Ensure that funds released for projects are properly utilized	30.2%	69.8%
17	Agencies tackle and advice on ecological/environmental problems	17.8%	82.2%
18	Liaise with host communities for the enhancement of the welfare	23.6%	76.4%
19	Liaise with oil companies to ensure environmental protection and pollution	31.3%	68.7%

Table 4b: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showing whether the interventionist strategies by various commissions and committees are significantly not related to the development of the Niger Delta region

<i>s/n</i>	<i>Variables</i>		<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F Ratio</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
14	NDDC and MNDA: formulate policies and guidelines for ND	Between Groups	281.364	1	281.364	119.041	.000
		Within Groups	1973.599	835	2.364		
		Total	2254.963	836			
15	Govt. commissions and agencies: accordance with set rules and regulations	Between Groups	53.298	1	53.298	17.308	.000
		Within Groups	2571.368	835	3.079		
		Total	2624.667	836			
16	Ensure that funds released for projects are properly utilized	Between Groups	34.928	1	34.928	7.652	.006
		Within Groups	3811.368	835	4.565		
		Total	3846.296	836			
17	Agencies tackle and advice on ecological/environmental problems	Between Groups	169.956	1	169.956	56.388	.000
		Within Groups	2516.711	835	3.014		
		Total	2686.667	836			
18	Liaise with host communities for the enhancement of the welfare	Between Groups	137.664	1	137.664	35.128	.000
		Within Groups	3272.336	835	3.919		
		Total	3410.000	836			
19	Liaise with oil companies to ensure environmental protection and pollution	Between Groups	5.106	1	5.106	11.716	.008
		Within Groups	2484.079	835	2.975		
		Total	2489.185	836			

#### Research Question 4 and Hypothesis 4

To what extent are respondents' opinions, based on their demographic information related to the variables tested?

The respondents' opinions, based on their demographic information are significantly not related to the variables tested.

Table 5: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showing respondents' opinions, based on their demographic information are significantly related to the variables tested. The ANOVA analysis (Table 8) indicates that respondents' opinions are significantly related to the variables tested. The ANOVA analysis reveals that respondents, irrespective of gender ( $F = 1.227, p > .299$ ), age ( $F = 2.357, p > .070$ ), marital status ( $F = 1.160, p > .324$ ), level of education ( $F = .980, p > .401$ ), status of respondents ( $F = 1.797, p > .166$ ), and state of Origin ( $F = 1.539, p > .215$ ) shows significant relationship in their overall perception of all the variables tested. Thus, hypothesis 4 was rejected.

Table 5: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showing respondents' opinions, based on their demographic information are significantly related to the variables tested

s/n	Respondents background information	Freq.	%	F Ratio	Sig.	
1	Gender	Male	589	70.4	1.227	.299
		Female	248	29.6		
2	Age	20-30 years	514	61.4	2.357	.070
		31-40 years	276	33.0		
		41-50 years	31	3.7		
		Above 50 years	16	1.9		
3	Marital Status	Single	284	33.9	1.160	.324
		Married	553	66.1		
4	Level of Education	School Cert/Diploma	279	33.3	.980	.401
		Undergraduate	372	44.4		
		First degree/HND	124	14.8		
		Postgraduate degree	62	7.4		
5	Status of Respondents	Ex-militants	403	48.1	1.797	.166
		Staff of Commissions and Agencies	108	12.9		
		The public	326	38.9		
6	State of Origin	Abia	27	3.2	1.539	.215
		Akwa Ibom	35	4.2		
		Bayelsa	413	49.3		
		Cross Rivers	67	8.0		
		Delta	112	13.4		
		Edo	57	6.8		
		Rivers	126	15.1		

## CONCLUSION

The researcher evaluated the illegal oil bunkering and the Niger Delta Crisis in the post amnesty Bayelsa State of Nigeria. The expansion of illegal oil bunkering, amnesty offer and programs including the interventionist strategies are related to the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region. It is the belief in this study that major landmark contributions have been made in the discussion of illegal oil bunkering and the Niger Delta Crisis and the post amnesty Bayelsa State of Nigeria.

The connections between Niger Delta crises, human security arising from illegal oil bunkering and governance is made. The study informs us that it is not simply enough to offer amnesty to ex-militants, in order to ensure that the Niger Deltans have the opportunity to succeed, live in a secure environment and participate in governance.

The results might assist government, policymakers, researchers, and stakeholders in the region to come to terms with empirical information regarding the role of government in the expansion of illegal bunkering and militancy in the region, as well as the inaction by government to seriously address the plight of the Niger Deltans. It is the conviction of the researcher that this text might ultimately lead to a new development or inclusion in a literature on Niger Delta crisis, because the study covered a lot of grounds both theoretically and empirically,

## Recommendations

This study recommends that:

- The illegal oil bunkering, which is significantly related to the crisis and underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region should be addressed through ensuring that the petro dollar money laundering is reduced to the minimum.
- The amnesty offer and programs including the post amnesty program in the Niger Delta region must be revisited to ensure that major issues in the Niger crisis are addressed.
- The interventionist strategies by various commissions and committees must be strengthened to significantly impact on the development of the Niger Delta region.

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